Sausage-Making Often Relies on the Good Sense of the Chef Rather than the Recipe

By gmurai, June 18, 2026

Even for lawyers, the rules governing litigation can get complex and convoluted. Does something need to be filed? What needs to be filed? When is the deadline for filing?

Simple questions with not always with straightforward answers.

This was the case in R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California, 111 Cal.App.5th 878 (2025), which involved sheet metal panels lost when they fell into the Port of Long Beach harbor.

The R & J Sheet Metal Case

In 2013, the City of Long Beach hired general contractor W.E. O’Neill Construction Co. of California (“WEO”) for a project at the Port of Long Beach. WEO in turn hired subcontractor R&J Sheet Metal, Inc. to furnish and install sheet metal on the project. R&J purchased the sheet metal for the project from Joseph Karscig, Inc. doing business as Architectural Systems, Inc. (“ASI”).

In 2014, for reasons unexplained in the case, some of the sheet metal panels purchased by R&J from ASI fell into the harbor. A dispute then arose as to who should pay for the replacement panels.

In 2015, R&J filed a lawsuit against WEO for failing to pay for the lost panels, against the City to enforce a stop payment notice filed by R&J which included its costs for the lost panels, and against ASI failing to provide all required materials and warranties.

ASI in turn filed a cross-complaint against R&J, WEO and two payment bond sureties, Continental and Western, for payment of materials furnished by ASI on the project.

Finally, WEO filed its own cross-complaint against R&J claiming that R&J failed to defend, indemnify and hold harmless WEO and to provide required warranties.

This dog pile of competing claims was ultimately resolved by motion for summary adjudication, whereby, the trial court ruled in favor of ASI finding that:

1. R&J, WEO, Continental and Western were jointly and severally liable to ASI in the principal amount of $42,566.22 with prejudgment interest of $18,084.66;
2. R&J, WEO and Continental were jointly and severally liable to ASI for additional prejudgment interest of $151.58;
3. R&J was solely liable to ASI for additional prejudgment interest of $16,817.07;
4. R&J, WEO, and Continental were jointly and severally liable to ASI for attorneys’ fees of $299,443; and
5. WEO and Continental were jointly and severally liable to ASI for additional attorneys fees’ of $29,471.

After judgment was entered in favor of ASI, WEO requested that ASI provide a breakdown of the amounts owed by WEO and its sureties. ASI provided a breakdown totaling $422,322.15 which was later paid by WEO’s insurer on September 30, 2019.

Thereafter, a series of events took place:

1. On October 16, 2019, R&J filed a notice of appeal of the judgment;
2. On October 17, 2019, ASI filed acknowledgments of satisfaction of judgment for the amounts paid by WEO and its sureties; and
3. On October 29, 2019, WEO filed a motion for contribution under Code of Civil Procedure section 881 through 883 seeking contribution by joint-debtor R&J.

Because R&J had filed its notice of appeal before WEO had filed its motion for contribution, the trial court ruled that WEO’s motion was stayed pending the appeal.

Then, following R&J’s appeal another series of events took place:

1. On February 21, 2023, R&J, WEO and its sureties, and the City filed a joint status conference statement indicating that R&J’s appeal had concluded;
2. On February 27, 2023, the trial court lifted the stay; and
3. On September 27, 2023, WEO re-filed their motion for contribution seeking an order that R&J pay one-half of the amount paid by WEO.

R&J, in opposition to WEO’s motion, argued that it didn’t owe one-half of the amount paid by WEO, but rather, one-third or even one-quarter of the amount paid depending on the line item in the judgment. R&J also argued that WEO’s motion was time-barred because it was filed seven months after the trial court lifted the stay.

On November 22, 2023, the trial court ruled that WEO’s motion was timely filed because WEO’s original motion had been filed within the statutory deadline. The trial court further ruled that the judgment was effectively against only two parties – WEO and R&J – and that liability should be allocated pro-rata between the two fifty-fifty.

R&J appealed.

The Appeal

Timeliness of Appeal

As an initial matter, the 2nd District Court of Appeals noted that under Rule 8.104(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, an appeal must be filed on or before: (1) 60 days after the clerk of the superior court serves a “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment showing the date either was served; (2) 60 days after a party serves a “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a file-endorsed copy of the judgment accompanied by a proof of service; or (3) 180 days after entry of judgment.

Here, following the hearing on WEO’s motion for contribution, the clerk of the superior court mailed a copy of trial court’s minute order to WEO directing WEO to give notice to all other parties on November 22, 2023. While the minute order was accompanied by a certificate of mailing showing the date the minute order was mailed, the minute order itself was not dated. On November 29, 2023, WEO served a “Notice of Ruling on Motion” – not a “Notice of Entry” of judgment – attaching the minute order and the clerk’s certificate of mailing.

None of these documents, explained the Court of Appeal, satisfied the requirements of Rule 8.104(a)(1). Therefore, the deadline for R&J to file its notice of appeal was 180 days after judgment, which R&J timely did.

Appeal of Contribution Order

In its notice of appeal form, R&J incorrectly checked the box that was appealing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)-(13) (which applies to appeals from orders other than judgments) rather than 904.1(a)(2) (which applies to appeals from judgments).

WEO argued that R&J’s failure to cite an applicable basis for appeal in the notice of appeal required the dismissal of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal disagreed noting that Rule 8.100(a)(2) of the California Rules of Court requires that notices of appeal “must be liberally construed.”

R&J in turn argued that the trial court should have ruled that WEO’s motion for contribution was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the trial court lifted the stay. R&J further argued that the trial court could not rely on the date WEO’s original motion was filed because R&J’s then pending appeal stayed further legal action and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear let alone take the original motion off calendar. Finally, R&J argued that WEO’s second motion for contribution, which was not identical to its original motion for contribution, was not simply a re-filing of its original motion for contribution.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. With respect to R&J’s argument that WEO’s second motion for contribution had to be filed within 30 days of trial court’s lifting of the stay, the Court of Appeal stated:

Although not expressly stated, we presume R&J is arguing the second motion, assuming it could rely on the original for purposes of timeliness, nonetheless had to be brought within 30 days of the remittitur. R&J cites no authority for this proposition. The only timeliness requirement imposed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 883 is that the contribution motion be filed within 30 days of full satisfaction of judgment. The WEO defendants met this requirement when they filed their original contribution motion. Section 883 imposes no additional deadlines for placing the motion on calendar, restoring the motion to calendar if it is taken off calendar, or updating the motion to include postjudgment interest. Because the WEO defendants met the applicable deadline, there was no need for any “tolling” based on the section 916 stay. Nor does section 883 require the WEO defendants to revive, refile, update, or otherwise invoke their request for contribution by any particular time after the remittitur issued.

The Court of Appeal also disagreed with R&J’s contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear, let alone, take WEO’s original motion off calendar and, therefore, the trial could not find that WEO’s second motion was timely by reference to the date when WEO’s original motion was filed:

If the purpose of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 916 [stay of proceedings in the trial court following appeal] is to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the appeal, the trial court did just that by declining to address the contribution motion until the appeal was resolved. Merely accepting the filing of the motion and taking it off calendar does not jeopardize the status quo or risk affecting the outcome of the appeal. R&J cites no authority holding otherwise.

The trial court’s approach also makes sense as a matter of judicial economy. A section 916 stay does not permanently deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, it simply suspends that jurisdiction while the appeal is ongoing. Given the trial court’s jurisdiction would be restored upon completion of the appeal, it was sensible for the court to stay further proceedings on the contribution motion by taking it off calendar rather than dismiss it outright and require the movant to refile the motion.

Finally, the Court of Appeal disagreed with R&J’s assertion that WEO’s second motion for contribution “must be determined on its own merits, ignoring the first motion” because it was not identical to WEO’s original motion:

Conceivably, a second contribution motion could so materially differ from an earlier motion that the second motion must be treated as an entirely separate motion that cannot rely on the timeliness of the first. Here, however, R&J simply notes the differences, with no discussion of the differences or explanation why they are material, apart from the addition of postjudgment interest. This is insufficient to establish the second motion is anything other than the original motion permissibly updated to include postjudgment interest.

Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s fifty-fifty pro-rata allocation was proper for several reasons. First, explained the Court of Appeal, the trial court properly considered WEO’s contribution motion because the joint and several judgment against WEO and R&J did not apportion liability and there was no contractual agreement between the parties as to how such liability would be apportioned. Second, R&J’s claims against WEO and the City remained to be tried. Thus, “neither the contribution order nor R&J’s compliance with that order impedes the parties’ ability to litigate those untried matters. Finally, held the Court of Appeal, contribution orders encourage that judgments be paid promptly:

It is desirable that judgments be paid promptly. The contribution statutes encourage this by ensuring a judgment debtor who promptly pays a judgment can also promptly obtain repayment from the other judgment debtors. If, as R&J asserts, the judgment debtor cannot obtain repayment without first adjudicating all unresolved related matters among the judgment debtors, that judgment debtor would be discouraged from paying the judgment and shouldering the full financial burden for however long it takes to resolve those matters. This means the judgment creditor, despite having prevailed in its own lawsuit, may not be made whole until the judgment debtors sort out their own disputes. Better that all judgment debtors pay a pro rata share up front (absent a judgment or underlying instrument providing otherwise), thus promptly making the judgment creditor whole. Then, the judgment debtors can resolve any remaining issues among themselves, which may result in a debtor recovering some or all of its pro rata payment from the other debtors, an “offset” in the language of Security Pacific.(Supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.)

Conclusion

And that, folks, is how sausage is made. It ain’t pretty and often relies less on recipes than general concepts of fairness depending on the ingredients being used. One of my former colleagues even has a meat grinder in his office for this very reason.